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JOHN B. SWANK, DOUGLAS KENT 
ALLYN dba J & D PROPERTIES, a 
California Partnership; 
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN and RICHARD 
JOHN ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND 
COMPANY, a California 
Partnership, all dba PARKWAY 
VILLAGE, a joint venture, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
Case No. 900460-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
I I I I I ! \ — 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant 
to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. S78-2a-3 (2) (j) . The 
Defendants appeal two summary judgments rendered bv the Third 
District Courtf in and for the County of Salt Lake, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Timothy Hanson and the Honorable John 
Rokich each presiding. Both cases on appeal were subsequently 
consolidated by the Utah Supreme Court prior to their transfer 
to the Court of Appeals. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the granting of summary judgment was 
appropriate in each of these cases. 
2. Whether the Defendants admissions on file and 
opposing affidavit presented a genuine issue of material fact 
precluding summary judgment. 
3. Whether the representations of Plaintiff's agent 
in regards to the personal liability of Appellants is an issue 
that must be heard by the trial court prior to the Court en-
tering judgment against the Appellants personally. 
4. Whether Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law against Appellants personally. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellee (Interlake), initiated three (3) fore-
closure actions against John Swank and the Appellants (Allyns) 
relating to real property situated at 315 East 300 South and 
1092 Gambel Place in Salt Lake County, State of tjtah. Two of 
these actions were brought against the property located at 
1092 Gambel Place. These actions were later consolidated 
before Judge Hansen. The third action was brought against the 
property located at 315 East 300 South. This action came 
before Judge Rokich. 
Attached to each Complaint were copies of the var-
ious documents that ultimately were relied upon by Interlake 
in its Motion for Summary Judgment. It is interesting to note 
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that upon close review of these documents, the signatures as 
they relate to the Allyns are often inconsistent with the 
named parties. In addition, the Allyns usually sign in a 
representative capacity. It is also interesting to note that 
the documentation was prepared by Interlake and was witnessed 
by Interlake's agent, Jeffrey Perkins. 
Interlake propounded Interrogatories and Requests 
for Admissions to the Allyns. In answer, the Allyns acknow-
ledged signing the documents referred to in the Complaints, 
acknowledged there being a default and set forth an affirma-
tive defense that the Allyns were assured by Interlake1s 
agent, Jeffrey Perkins, that Interlake would look only to the 
property and not the Allyns personally for repayment of the 
debt in the event of default. Amended Response to Request for 
Admissions par. 3. A copy of Allyns Amended Response to 
Request for Admissions is attached as an addendum to this 
Brief. 
On or about June 22, 1989, the Allyns counsel with-
drew from the case. Interlake, after serving its Notice to 
Appoint New Counsel, subsequently brought its Motions for 
Summary Judgment on November 6, 1989. The Allyns response to 
the requested admissions were used as the basis for Interlake's 
Motion and were attached as Exhibits. Interlake arqued that 
there was no dispute of fact as to the signatures on the 
documents and that as a matter of law it was entitled to 
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summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
On or about November 16, 1989, the Allyns1 counsel 
entered an Appearance and moved ex parte for an extension of 
time to respond to Interlake1s Motions. Interlake then filed 
its Requests for Ruling and Objections to Allyns1 Motion. Inter-
lake^ objections were mainly based on allegations that the 
Allyns had no meritorious defense to any Motions for Summary 
Judgment. Specifically, Interlake argued that none of the 
transaction documents evidenced Allyns1 claims that they would 
have no personal liability for the transactions. 
Judge Hanson declined to rule on Allyns1 ex parte 
Motion until Interlake submitted its response in accordance 
with Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration. Judge 
Rokich, however, granted the Allyns additional time to file a 
response in the matter before him. On or about December 18, 
1989, Allyns submitted their Memorandum in Opposition to Motion 
for Summary Judgment, together with an opposing Affidavit of 
Douglas Allyn. The opposing Affidavit stated upon personal 
knowledge that Jeffrey Perkins, an officer of Interlake Thrift, 
assured the affiant at the time the loan transaction was entered 
into, that Interlake would only look to the property and not 
to the Allyns personally for recovery of the debt in the event 
of default. A similar opposing affidavit was filed in the 
case before Judge Hanson at about the same time. Copies of 
the Affidavits are attached as an Addendum to this Brief. 
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On January 5, 1990, Judge Hanson ruled that for the 
reasons stated in Interlake's Objection, Allyns' Motion for 
Additional Time should be denied. In addition, Judge Hanson 
granted Interlake's Motion for Summary Judgment based on the 
pleadings and supporting documentation. Judcre Hanson signed 
his Order and Decree of Forclosure on February 6f 1990. 
On January 11, 1990, Interlake filed its Reply 
Memorandum in the case before Judge Rokich. In its Reply, 
Interlake argued that the Parole Evidence Rule made the oppos-
ing Affidavit of Douglas K. Allyn inadmissible as evidence and 
therefore Interlake was entitled to Judgment as a matter of 
law. In addition to its Reply Memorandum, Interlake's counsel 
addressed a letter to Judge Rokich and argued that the result 
in that case must follow the result of its companion case be-
fore Judge Hanson. Attached to the letter was a copy of Judcre 
Hanson's ruling dated January 5, 1990 grantina summary iudqment 
to Interlake. 
Judge Rokich subsequently granted Interlake's Motion 
"for the reasons set forth in Plaintiff's Memorandum.11 Judae 
Rokich signed his Order and Decree of Foreclosure on Februarv 1, 
1990. The Allyns appealed from each judgment by filing separate 
Notices of Appeal on March 1, 1990. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The granting of Interlake's Motions for Summary 
Judgment were inappropriate under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Interlake's Motions were based on the 
-6-
Defendants admissions on file, which when viewed in their en-
tirety, raise the issue of the Defendants personal liability 
in this matter. In addition, the opposing Affidavit of Douglas 
Allyn raises genuine issues of material fact which both trial 
courts should have determined by the evidence orior to entering 
judgment in Plaintiff's favor. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE ADMISSIONS ON PILE AND THE OPPOSING AFFIDAVITS 
RAISE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT 
THAT PRECLUDES SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Interlake moved for summary judgment based on the 
documents attached as exhibits to the Complaints and upon the 
Allyns1 Amended Response to Requests for Admissions. In their 
response, the Allyns admitted to their signature being on the 
documentation and admitted to the notes being in default. The 
Response to Admissions in the case before Judge Hanson clearly 
set forth the issue of the assurances made to the Allyns bv 
Interlake that the Allyns would not be looked to personally in 
the event of default, thereby inducing the Allyns1 signatures. 
The same issue is raised by the opposing Affidavits of Douglas 
Allyn filed with each Court. In addition, this issue was 
argued in Allyns1 Opposing Memorandum filed in the case before 
Judge Rokich, where reference was made to the opposing Affi-
davit of Douglas Allyn and to the Answers to Interrogatories 
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propounded by Interlake. Summary Judgment in both cases could 
only have been rendered if a genuine issue was not raised by 
the Admissions on file or the opposing Affidavits of Douglas 
Allyn. Otherwise, summary judgment is precluded. 
a. The Allyns1 reliance on their admissions in 
opposing Interlake1s Motion for Summary Judgment was proper. 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
sets forth the proceedings for obtaining a summary judgment. 
If the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavitsf if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, 
the judgment shall be rendered in favor of the moving party. 
The admissions on file can be in any form, including 
those requested pursuant to Rule 36. Not only may a moving 
party use the admissions of the adverse party to support a 
motion for summary judgment, the adverse party may also use 
his own admissions in opposing a motion or in bringing a 
similar motion of his own. 6 Moore's Federal Practice 
f56.11(6) 2nd ed. (1988). Compare Pace v. Southern Express 
Company, 409 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1969) cited therein. (The 
Court granted summary judgment to a party based on that par-
ties1 admissions and depositions.) 
In the present case, Interlake moved for summarv 
judgment based on the Allyns1 admissions. The admissions 
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filed in the case before Judge Hanson clearly raised the 
issues of whether there was fraudulent inducement and whether 
Interlake agreed to not hold the Allyns personally liable upon 
default. As a result, there was a genuine issue raised by the 
admissions on file that precluded summary judgment. Interlake 
should not be allowed to pick and chose through the record 
those portions it wants considered to achieve its desired 
result. Rule 56 clearly states that the admissions on file 
must be considered. 
b. The opposing Affidavits of Douglas Allyn were 
timely filed in both cases. 
Rule 56(c) allows the adverse party to serve oopos-
ing affidavits prior to the day of the hearing. The procedure 
follows that found in Rule 6(d) for other types of motions. 
Rule 6(d) requires that opposing affidavits be served not 
later than one day before the hearing unless the Court permits 
them to be served at some other time. 
Rule 4-501 of the Rules of Judicial Administration 
further define the proceeding in a motion for summary judgment. 
This rule sets forth briefing requirements of the parties. 
The responding party has ten days within which to file a 
memorandum in opposition to the motion and supporting documen-
tation. If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in 
opposition within ten days, the moving party may notify the 
clerk to submit the matter to the Court for decision. Upon 
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receiving the memorandum in opposition to motion, the moving 
party is then able to file a reply memorandum within five days 
after service. After the five day period has expired, either 
party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the Court 
for decision. 
Rule 4-501 is intended to establish a uniform pro-
cedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on despositive 
motions. See 4-501 of the Rules of Judicial Administration. 
Although Rule 4-501 has been elevated from being a Rule of 
Practice in the District Courts, it is intended to build upon 
the Rules of Civil Procedure and is not meant to change or to 
be inconsistent with those rules. Specifically, it does not 
redefine the time for filing opposing affidavits orior to the 
day of the hearing. It does allow the Court to make a ruling 
after the stated period. If there is no response or opposing 
affidavit, the Court can make its decision accordingly. The 
Rule, however, cannot be read to preclude the filing of affi-
davits after the stated periods. If the Court has not made 
its decision and there has not yet been a hearing, the affida-
vit on file must be considered with the rest of the record as 
outlined in 56(c) in determining whether genuine issues exist. 
In the present case, Interlake brought its Motion 
for Summary Judgment on or about November 6, 1989. On November 
16, 1989, the Allyns requested that they be permitted to file 
a tardy response to Interlake1s Motions. Judge Rokich permitted 
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the Allyns to file their response. An opposing Memorandum and 
Affidavit were filed on or about December 18, 1989. Another 
affidavit, similar to that filed with Judge Rokich, was filed 
at the same time in the case before Judge Hanson. Judge 
Hanson, however, denied Allyns1 Motion to extend the period 
for response and granted Interlakefs Motion for Summary Judg-
ment. This was done on January 5, 1990. 
Even though Judge Hanson denied the motion to extend 
the response dates, the Affidavit was filed prior to the date 
of Judge Hanson's decision. It therefore was part of the 
record to be considered under Rule 56(c). The Affidavits 
again raised the issues of whether there was a fraudulent 
inducement and whether Interlake agreed to not hold the Allyns 
personally liable, thereby precluding summary -judgment. 
c. The admissions and opposing affidavit were 
admissible and should have been considered by the trial Courts. 
Rule 56(e) sets forth the forum of affidavits that 
are required. The affidavit must be made on personal knowledae 
and should set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence and should affirmatively show that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Tt further 
states that an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allega-
tions or denials of its pleading but must respond by affidavit 
or as otherwise provided in the Rule, setting forth specific 
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facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the 
opposing party does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
In the case at bar, there is no question that the 
Allyns responded by affidavit in both proceedings and by 
opposing memorandum in the matter before Judge Rokich. The 
Memorandum in addition referred to the Answers to Interlake1s 
Interrogatories. Even if, for purposes of argument, there had 
been no affidavits filed, the Allyns1 Response to Reauest for 
Admissions raised a genuine issue to be determine by the Court 
as is argued above. Summary Judgment was not appropriate 
under Rule 56(c) where the Admissions on file raised a genuine 
issue of a material fact. Therefore, Summary Judgment was 
inappropriate even if Judge Hanson's denial of the Allvns 
Request for Leave to File a Tardy Response meant that there 
had been no response by them. 
The Allyns, however, did respond as has been argued 
above. The sufficiency of that response, however, was attacked 
by Interlake. Specifically, Interlake argued that the Parole 
Evidence Rule excluded the admissions and the testimony prof-
fered in the opposing Affidavits. 
The opposing Affidavits on their face stated that 
the Affiant was competent to testify and that the facts stated 
were made on his personal knowledge. Furthermore, the Affiant 
set forth that in conversations with Jeff Perkins, an agent of 
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Interlake, Affiant was assured that there would be no personal 
liability on the documents signed by the Allyns. The Affiant 
stated that based on these assurances the documents were 
executed. The Affidavits, therefore, meet the requirements of 
Rule 56(e) unless the statements are inadmissible because of 
the Parole Evidence Rule as argued by Interlake. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Union Bank v. Swenson, 7 07 
P.2d 663 (Utah 1985), addressed this particular issue on facts 
that are very similar to those in the case at bar. Tn Union 
Bank, the Swensons signed the note with the bank "individually 
and personally". The Appellant also signed as president of 
State Lumber, Inc. The loan subsequently became due and 
default followed. The Swensons thereafter contested personal 
liability on the note. They alleged that the bank representa-
tive assured them that they would not be held personally 
liable and that without such assurances they would not have 
signed the documents. The trial court applied the Parole 
Evidence Rule and found no genuine issue of material fact and 
accordingly granted summary judgment in favor of the bank. 
The Supreme Court reversed the trial courts finding 
based on the fact that the parole evidence rule has a very 
narrow application. Simply stated, the Rule operates in the 
absence of fraud to exclude contemporaneous conversations, 
statements or representations offered for the purpose of 
varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract. 
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Therefore, the Court stated that the trial court must first 
determine whether the writing was intended by the parties to 
be an integration. It noted that resolving this preliminary 
question of fact, parole evidence, indeed any relevant evi-
dence, is admissable. It further stated that parole evidence 
is admissable to show the circumstances under which the con-
tract was made or the purpose for which the writing was 
executed. This is so even after the writing is determined to 
be an integrated contract. Admitting parole evidence in such 
circumstances, avoids the enforcement of a writing that appears 
to be a binding integration but in fact is not because of 
fraud or other avoidable cause. 
In the present case, Interlake has asserted that the 
documents are complete and on their face appear to be the 
final agreement between the parties. While the documents are 
standard form documents, the way they were prepared by Inter-
lake begs the question of whether they were integrated 
contracts. The signature lines and parties named in the 
various documents as they concern the Allyns were not consis-
tent and lead to confusion as to who the parties were intended 
to be. 
Both Judge Rokich and Judge Hanson apparently deter-
mined the documentation to be intended as integrated contracts 
and that there was no fraudulent inducement and then decided as 
a matter of law that summary judgment was proper. These are 
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questions of fact. In this case, both Courts have to deter-
mine whether or not the contract between the parties was 
integrated. In addition, they have to determine whether there 
are causes for avoiding the judicial enforcement of said 
documents. In regards to these issues, the parole evidence 
rule is not applicable and therefore does not exclude the 
testimony and admissions of the Allyns from the Courts consid-
eration. Indeed, those very issues have to be resolved before 
the parole evidence rule comes into play. Therefore, summary 
judgment is precluded in both cases. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the admissions on file and the opposinq 
Affidavits of Douglas Allyn genuinely raise a material issue, 
summary judgment was inappropriately granted by both Judge 
Hanson and Judge Rokich. Each summary iudgment must be rever-
sed and the matters must each be remanded for further findinq 
as to whether the Allyns are personally liable under the 
documentation sought to be enforced by Interlake. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this>y ^ ^ d a y of September, 
1990. 
Jonn/Burton An 
(Ke^ in V. Olsen 




CERTIFICATB OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed * true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant on this 'IJA day of 
September, 1990, postage prepaid to John A. Anderson, VAN 
COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY at 50 South Main Street, 
Suite 1600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
jfJA/VLii /* yfAhnrforftA 
JOHN BURTON ANDERSON *0092 
KEVIN V. OLSEN #4105 
Anderson & Dunn 
2039 East 7000 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephones (801) 944-0990 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
USA FINACIAL CORPORATION, ) 
dba Interlake Thrift - ) 
Mortgage Division, a Utah ) 
corporation, ) 
) AMENDED RESPONSE TO 
Plaintiffs, ) REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS 
vs. ) 
JOHN B. SWANK and DOUGLAS KENT ) 
ALLYN dba J & D PROPERTIES, ) Civil No. C86-6724 
a California Partnership; DOUGLAS ) 
KENT ALLYN and RICHARD JOHN ALLYN, ) Honorable John A. Rokich 
SR., dba ALLYN AND COMPANY, ) 
a California Partnership, ) 
Defendants. ) 
Come now, the Defendants, Douglas Kent Allyn, 
Richard John Allyn, Sr. and Allyn and Company, a California 
Partnership and pursuant to Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure answer Plaintiff's First Set of Requests for 
Admissions as follows: 
REQUEST NO, 1: Admit that the document attached 
to Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy 
of a Promissory Note executed by Defendant Douglas Kent Allyn 
on or about May 29, 1985. 
ANSWER: Admit 
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REQUEST NO. 2: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy 
of a Promissory Note executed by Defendant Richard John Allyn, 
Sr. on or about May 29, 1985. 
ANSWER: Admit 
REQUEST NO. 3: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn and 
Richard John Allyn executed said Exhibit "A" for and in behalf 
of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: Admit that Defendants signed for Allyn and 
Company to obtain funding to complete the Parkway Village 
project. According to Jeff Perkins, Interlake could not lend 
Swank more money because Swank's loan amount would then exceed 
it's legal limits. Interlake needed to make part of the loan 
to another company. Allyn and Company consented to signing for 
part of the loan after receiving assurances from Perkins that 
Richard J. Allyn and Douglas Kent Allyn would not be personally 
liable and that if there was a problem Interlake would simply 
take the property back without any personal liability. Douglas 
Kent Allyn and John Swank were working together on the Parkway 
Village project. 
REQUEST NO. 4: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn and 
Richard John Allyn executed said Exhibit "A" for and in behalf 
of Allyn and Company. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 3 above. 
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REQUEST NO. 5: Admit that John B. Swank was a 
partner in Parkway Village, a joint venture, along with Douglas 
Kent Allyn and Richard John Allyn, Sr., d/b/a Allyn and Company. 
ANSWER: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn was working 
with John B. Swank on a retainer basis with the anticipation 
that Allyn would receive a certain percentage of the Parkway 
Village project once it was put together. 
REQUEST NO. 6: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy 
of a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rights executed by 
Richard John Allyn, Sr. on or about May 29, 1985. 
ANSWER: Admit 
REQUEST NO. 7: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr., 
executed said Exhibit "B" for and in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 3 above. 
REQUEST NO. 8: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr., 
executed said Exhibit "B" for and in behalf of Allyn and 
Company. 
ANSWER: Admit, see paragraph 3 above. 
REQUEST NO. 9: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy 
of an Additional Funds Agreement executed by Douglas Kent 
Allyn on or about June 10, 1985. 
ANSWER: Admit 
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RBQUBST HO. 10: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6724 a Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy of 
an Additional Funds Agreement executed by Richard John Allynr 
Sr. on or about June 10, 1985. 
ANSWER: Admit that Exhibit "C" is a true and correct 
copy, but deny execution of document by Richard J. Allyn. 
Douglas Kent Allyn is the one who actually executed the document 
for Richard J. Allyn. 
REQUEST NO. 11: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn and 
Richard John Allyn, Sr. executed said Exhibit "C" for and in 
behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn signed for 
Richard J. Allyn for Allyn & Company. See paragraph 3 above. 
REQUEST NO. 12: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn and 
Richard John Allyn, Sr. executed said Exhibit "C" for and in 
behalf of Allyn and Company. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 11 above. 
REQUEST NO. 13: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "D" is a true and correct copy 
of an Additional Funds Agreement executed by Richard John 
Allyn, Sr. on or about September 23, 1985. 
ANSWER: Admit 
REQUEST NO. 14: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
executed said Exhibit "D" for and in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 3 above. 
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REQUSST HO. 15: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
executed said Exhibit "D" for and in behalf of Allyn and 
Company. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 3 above. 
REQUEST NO. 16: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "E" is a true and correct copy 
of a Renewal Agreement executed by Douglas Kent Allyn on 
February 13, 1986. 
ANSWER: Admit 
REQUEST NO. 17: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn 
executed said Exhibit "E" for and in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 3 above. 
REQUEST NO. 18: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn 
executed said Exhibit "E" for and in behalf of Allyn and 
Company. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 3 above. 
REQUEST NO. 19: Admit the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "F" is a true and correct copy 
of a Renewal Agreement executed by Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
on or about November 29, 1985. 
ANSWER: Admit 
REQUEST NO. 20: Admit the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "F" is a true and correct copy 
of a Renewal Agreement executed by Douglas Kent Allyn on or 
about November 29, 1985. 
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ANSWER: Admit 
REQUEST WO. 21: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
executed said Exhibit "F" for and in behalf of Allyn and 
Company. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 3 above* 
REQUEST NO. 22: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
executed said Exhibit "F" for and in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 3 above. 
REQUEST NO. 23: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr., 
executed said Exhibit "F" for and in behalf of himself. 
ANSWER: Deny. Although the document shows signing 
as an individual, Defendant was signing for the partnership. 
According to Jeff Perkins, there was to be no personal liability 
of the Defendants. 
REQUEST NO. 24: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn 
executed said Exhibit "F" for and in behalf of Allyn and Company. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 3 above. 
REQUEST NO. 25: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn 
executed said Exhibit "F" for and in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 3 above. 
REQUEST NO. 26: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn 
executed said Exhibit MF" for and in behalf of himself. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 23 above. 
REQUEST NO. 27: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "G" is a true and correct copy 
-7~ 
of a Promissory Note executed by Richard John Allyn, Sr. on or 
about March 31, 1986. 
ANSWERS Defendants do not recall this document and 
therefore deny. 
REQUEST NO. 28: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "G" is a true and correct copy 
of a Promissory Note executed by Douglas Kent Allyn on or 
about March 31, 1986. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 29: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
executed said Exhibit "G" for and in behalf of Allyn and 
Company. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 30: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
executed said Exhibit "G" for and in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 31: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
executed said Exhibit "G" for and in behalf of himself. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 32: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn 
executed Exhibit "6" for and in behalf of Allyn and Company. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 33: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn, Sr. 
executed Exhibit "G" for and in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
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RBQUBST NO. 34: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn 
executed said Exhibit "G" for and in behalf of himself. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 35: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "H" is a true and correct copy 
of a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents executed by 
Richard John Allyn, Sr. on or about March 31, 1986. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 36: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "H" is a true and correct copy 
of a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents executed by 
Douglas Kent Allyn on or about March 31, 1986. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 37: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
executed Exhibit "H" for and in behalf of Allyn and Company. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 38: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
executed Exhibit "H" for and in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 39: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
executed Exhibit "H" for and in behalf of himself. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 40: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn 
executed said Exhibit "H" for and in behalf of Allyn and 
Company. 
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ANSWERI See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 41: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn 
executed said Exhibit "H" for and in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 42: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn 
executed said Exhibit f,H" for and in behalf of himself. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 43: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy 
of a Promissory Note executed by John B. Swank on or about May 
29, 1985. 
ANSWER: Defendant Douglas Kent Allyn was present 
when many of the documents were signed by John B. Swank and to 
the best of his recollection admits that Mr. Swank executed 
this document. 
REQUEST NO. 44: Admit that Swank executed said 
Exhibit "A" for and in behalf of Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard 
John Allyn, Sr., d/b/a Allyn and Company. 
ANSWER: Deny. Originally, the purchaser of the 
Parkway Property was to be in a corporate name or Swanks name. 
Jeff Perkins indicated, however, that the Plaintiff could not 
do that because the loan amount would exceed its legal limit. 
As explained in paragraph 3 above, Allyn and Company signed on 
the previous documents responded to. Swank, however, was not 
authorized to sign for Allyn and Company, Douglas Kent Allyn 
or Richard J. Allyn. 
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REQUEST NO. 45: Admit that Swank executed said Exhibit 
"A" for and in behalf of himself. 
ANSWER: Defendant can only speculate Mr. Swank's 
intent and therefore denies, letting the document speak for 
itself. See also paragraph 44 above. 
REQUEST NO. 46: Admit that Swank executed said Exhibit 
"A" for and in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 45 above. 
REQUEST NO. 47: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy 
of a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents executed by John 
B. Swank on or about May 29/ 1985. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 43 above. 
REQUEST NO. 48: Admit that Swank executed said 
Exhibit "B" for and in behalf of Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard 
John Allyn, Sr., d/b/a/ Allyn and Company. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 44 above. 
REQUEST NO. 49: Admit that Swank executed said 
Exhibit "B" for and in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 45 above. 
REQUEST NO. 50: Admit that Swank executed said 
Exhibit "B" for and in behalf of himself. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 45 above. 
REQUEST NO. 51: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy 
of a Renewal Agreement executed by John B. Swank. 
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ANSWESi See paragraph 43 above. 
REQUEST NO. 52: Admit that Swank executed said 
Exhibit "C for and in behalf of Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard 
John Allyn, Sr., d/b/a Allyn and Company. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 44 above. 
REQUEST NO* 53: Admit that Swank executed said 
Exhibit "C" for and in behalf of himself. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 45 above. 
REQUEST NO. 54: Admit that Swank executed said 
Exhibit "B" for and in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 45 above. 
REQUEST NO. 55: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit "D" is a true and correct copy 
of a Promissory Note executed by John B. Swank on or about 
March 31, 1986. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 43 above. 
REQUEST NO. 56: Admit that Swank executed said 
Exhibit "D" for and in behalf of Richard John Allyn, Sr. and 
Douglas Kent Allyn, d/b/a Allyn and Company. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 44 above. 
REQUEST NO. 57: Admit that Swank executed said 
Exhibit "D" for and in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 45 above. 
REQUEST NO. 58: Admit that Swank executed said 
Exhibit "D" for in behalf of himself. 
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AMSWERi See paragraph 45 above. 
REQUEST NO, 59: Admit that the documents attached to 
Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit "E" is a true and correct copy 
of a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents executed by John 
B. Swank on or about March 31, 1986. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 43 above. 
REQUEST NO. 60: Admit that Swank executed said 
Exhibit "E" for and in behalf of Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard 
John Allyn, Sr., d/b/a Allyn and Company. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 44 above. 
REQUEST NO. 61: Admit that Swank executed said 
Exhibit "E" for in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 45 above. 
REQUEST NO. 62: Admit that Swank executed said 
Exhibit "E" for in behalf of Allyn and Company. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 44 above. 
REQUEST NO. 63: Admit that Defendants failed to make 
payments according to the requirements of Exhibit "A" to 
Complaint C86-6724. 
ANSWER: Admit 
REQUEST NO. 64: Admit that Defendants failed to make 




RBQCJBST HO. 65: Admit that Defendants failed to make 
payments according to the requirements of Exhibit "D" to 
Complaint C86-6724. 
ANSWER: Admit 
REQUEST NO. 66: Admit that Defendants failed to make 
payments according to the requirements of Exhibit "G" to 
Complaint C86-6724. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 67: Admit that Defendants failed to make 
payments according to the requirements of Exhibit "A" to 
Complaint C86-6724. 
ANSWER: Admit 
REQUEST NO. 68: Admit that Defendants failed to make 
payments according to the requirements of Exhibit *D" to 
Complaint C86-6724. 
ANSWER: Admit 
DATED this JV* day of June, 1988. 
CERTIFICATE OF HAMPPBLIVERY 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Amended Response to Requests for 
Admissions were ^ hand-delivered on the VV* day of June, 1988, 
"ft * _« * ^ V. »w _ 
to John A. Anderson, VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY at 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600, Salt/Lake City, Utah 84145. 
JOHN BURTON ANDERSON #0092 
Anderson & Dunn 
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone: (801) 944-0990 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
dba Interlake Thrift -




JOHN B. SWANK, DOUGLAS KENT 
ALLYN dba J & D PROPERTIES, 
a California Partnership; 
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN and RICHARD 
JOHN ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND 
COMPANY, a California 
Partnership, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY OF ) 
The Affiant, Kent Allyn, being first duly sworn uoon 
oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. That he is competent to testify as a witness and 
personally knows the facts stated herein are true. 
2. That in connection with the loan transaction 
between Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard John Allyn, Sr., dba 
Allyn and Company and Interlake Thrift and is the subiect of 
the above-entitled litigation, the following is true to the 
best of Affiant's understanding and knowledge: 
* ' * > 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN 
Civil No. CB6-6726 
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a* The project which is the subiect of the loan 
made by Interlake Thrift to Affiant and to the 
other parties involved in this transaction was 
presented to these parties by Jeff Perkins who 
at the time was an officer of Plaintiff. 
b» Said Jeff Perkins particioated in putting 
the purchase of the property bv these parties 
together and upon information and belief, he, 
together with his employer, Interlake Thrift, 
received a commission from the seller of the 
property involved in the transaction. 
c. The initial money for the down payment in 
this transaction came from the loan amount made 
by Interlake Thrift to Mr. John Swank for the 
purchase of a separate project known as Parkway 
Village. 
d. Because efforts at getting a construction 
loan had failed, Plaintiff had agreed to advance 
funds in the amount of $200,000.00 to J & D 
Properties, Inc., which said Perkins had repre-
sented to be a valid corporation under the laws 
of the State of Utah in order to close the 
purchase of the land as part of the project. 
e. All signings by those Defendants were as 
corporate officers and not as individuals based 
on representations made by Perkins. 
f. After conversations with Perkins and as a 
means of accounting, Interlake Thrift and Perkins 
assured Affiant and others that there would be 
no personal liability toward them as part of the 
transaction and the parties then consented to 
signing for part of the loan. 
g. That Perkins represented that if the proiect 
did not go forward, Interlake Thrift would look 
only to the property and not to the Defendant's 
individually for satisfaction. Accordingly, 
Affiant and Richard John Allyn siqned the loan 
documents on that basis. 
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3, That the above information has been recited and 
given under oath to Plaintiff's as part of the "Response to 
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories11 dated July 22, 19«8 
and signed by Affiant and Richard John Allyn, a copy of which 
was delivered to Plaintiff, 
4, That the purpose of this Affidavit is to demon-
* it'll e f'he existance of questions of fact with respect to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff in this matter. 
DATED this /^ day of December, 1989. 
QffjClAt. CIM. 
JANE A. GUTHRIE 
NOT M .y PUBLIC CAUFOPH!/. 
PWNOPAL c f n a IN 
SAN Dlt GO COUNTY 
U y C o m m o n E»p May 3 1 . 1 W ^ 
SUBSCRIBED, SWORN TO AND ACKNOWLEDGED before me this 
/^?0W day of December, 1989. ..? 
/ / • > ! 
h 
l a s ^ e n t Allyn 
^/V 
My Commissipn Expires: jmmissipn 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Doualas Kent Allyn on this 
Iff day of December, 1989, postage prepaid to John A. 
Anderson, VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL S MCCARTHY at 50 South 
Main Street, Suite 1600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145. 
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JOHN BURTON ANDERSON #0092 
Anderson & Dunn 
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone: (801) 944-0990 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COORT 
IN ANn FOR SALT [,ARE COUNTY, STATE OK UTAH 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, ) 
dba Interlake Thrift - ) 
Mortgage Division, A Utah ) 
corporation, ) 
Plaintiff, ) AFFIDAVIT O? 
) DOUGLAS KENT ALLVN 
VS. ) 
) Civil No. CB6-6724 
JOHN B. SWANK, DOUGLAS KENT ). 
ALLYN dba J & D PROPERTIES, ) 
a California Partnership? ) 
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN and RICHARD) 
JOHN ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND) 
COMPANY, a California ) 
Partnership, ) 
Defendants. ) 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION ) 
dba Interlake Thrift - ) 
Mortgage Division, a Utah ) 
corporation, ) 
Plaintiff, ) Civil No. C96-6725 
vs. ) 
JOHN B. SWANK an individual, ) 
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN and RICHARD) 
JOHN ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND) 
COMPANY, a Partnership; all ) 




STATE OP CALIFORNIA ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY ) 
The Affiant, Kent Allyn, being first duly sworn uoon 
oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. That he is competent to testify as a witness and 
personally knows the facts stated herein are true. 
connection with the loan transactions 
f J it a i i d I I: i c! it a r d J o h n A1 ] ; - i 
Allyn and Company and USA Financial Corporation dba Interlake 
Thrift, pertaining to certain property known as "The Parkwav 
Vi 1 lage" which was a part thereof, the followina is true to 
the best of Affiant's understanding and knowledge: 
a. The Parkway village property was purchased 
from one of Interlake Thrift's customers who had 
completed approximately 50% of the proiect while 
being funded 100% of a construction loan of 
Interlake Thrift pertaining thereto. 
b. Originally the purchase was to be in the 
name of a corporation of the Defendants or in 
the alternative in the name of John Swank, one 
of the above Defendant's herein. Although Swank 
was the main strength to the transaction, Jeff 
Perkins, an officer of Interlake Thrift, indi-
cated that Interlake Thrift could not Rave the 
transaction in Swank's name because the total 
amount would exceed Interlake's legal limit. 
c. After conversations with Perkins and as a 
means of accounting, Interlake Thrift and Perkins 
assured Affiant and others that there would be 
no personal liability toward them as part of the 
transaction and the parties then consented to 
signing for part of the loan. 
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d That Perkins represented that if the project 
did not go forward, Interlake Thrift would look 
only to the property and not to the Defendants 
individually for satisfaction. Accordingly, 
Affiant and Richard John Allyn signed the loan 
documents on that basis. 
e. John Swank did not sign on behalf of Allyn 
and Company, Affiant or Richard John Allyn. 
f. In addition to representations of no personal 
liability in connection with said loans, Affiant 
and Richard John Allyn relied upon said Perkins 
representations as to the value and feasibility 
to this project and that Interlake Thrift would 
subsequently subordinate its interest in the 
project. 
g. All monies advanced by Interlake Thrift were 
used in either this project or a second project 
associated with this project. 
11, Neither Affiant nor Richard John Allyn 
received any funds from Interlake Thrift as part 
of said loan transaction. 
That the above information has been recited and 
given under oath to Plaintiff's as part of the "Response to 
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories" dated July 22, 198ft 
and signed by Affiant and Richard John Allyn, a copy of which 
-eel to PI a i " iff. 
4 That thp purpose of this Affidavit is to demon-
strate the existance of questions of fact with respect to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff in this matter. 
DATED this j ^ day of.December, 19R9. 
Z\ JAfJEA. GUTHRIE 
- 4 -
SUBSCRIBED, SWORN TO AND ACKNOWLEDGED before me this 
>4 
/^7"3day of December, 1989. 
My Commission Expires: 
-l "fv _ JS7 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Res id ing a t 
( /i M . < ; tt 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of Ite foregoing Affidavit of Douglas Kent Allyn on this 
—V *+-fJ 
I™ day of December, 1989, postage prepaid to John A. 
Andersor . vAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY at 5(1 South 
Main Street, Suite 1600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145. 
